6 injured when an “explosive object” fell on Taba

It is easy to predict the direction of the war in Gaza. It is a recurring war in different times and circumstances. Because of this repetition, Hamas has learned from Israel, just as Israel has learned from Hamas. Both sides have learned lessons of war, in all its dimensions, from the strategic to the tactical to the practical. The only difference is that Israel knows who its main, sustainable and historical ally is, unlike Hamas, which has changed its alliances a lot until reaching this stage.

This is the existence or non-existence phase of Hamas: has it reached its maximum military maturity after the success in the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation? Did you expect this success? Will this impressive military success be overlooked by an outside-state actor?

The best military plans don’t last the first few minutes after the first strike. The war plan is revealed at the beginning of the battle, so that there are no surprises. As a result, there is a constant and persistent effort on the part of fighters to adapt to reality. Hamas cannot deny its success, even if it was not expected. Success is itself a responsibility, requiring you to preserve it and benefit from it, because it crumbles over time. How will Hamas maintain its military victory? Where will it be translated?

The real theater of the war between Israel and Hamas is in the Gaza Strip and its immediate surroundings (the Gaza area). Every time one team exceeds the limits of the tacitly agreed upon rules of engagement, the other team responds with everything it has to redraw the old boundaries, but with new rules of engagement.

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood changed all the lines drawn in advance and broke every imaginable rule of engagement. Therefore, the Israeli response must be parallel (proportional) to the Hamas operation. Let’s imagine the regional and international repercussions of the results of the Hamas operation to know the extent of the damage the movement has inflicted on Israeli national security concepts.

In response restrictions

There are many factors limiting the Israeli response. In addition to the presence of hostages in the main theater of war, there is the difficulty of war in the cities, since it requires great efforts and great sacrifices, in equipment and means, and a long period necessary to complete the mission and succeed in it, and this is something that is not guaranteed in advance.

Added to these restrictions is the fear of a fire in the region, especially if Hezbollah, on orders from Iran, opened Lebanon’s southern front.

Consequently, the most important restriction emerges, namely the “Biden effect” factor. President Joe Biden seeks to design a deterrent system for regional security.

It is intended to deter those who want to interfere in the Gaza war and to keep the war in its geographical context, while at the same time providing protection to the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip.

Since deterrence requires flexing one’s muscles by demonstrating elements of force, American forces have strengthened their forces in the region in an unprecedented way.

Because deterrence requires the deterrent person to have a deep-down belief that the deterrent will use its capabilities if deterrence fails, America is working to respond militarily to attacks on its military bases in the region. But America’s greatest test will be when military persecution of its forces goes from indirect to effective.

America does not want a comprehensive and comprehensive military operation on all fronts of the Gaza Strip. Rather, it requires Israel to carry out limited operations, in several locations, aimed at targeting Hamas’ infrastructure, particularly its leadership.

The third operation is limited to the sector

Israel has carried out a new ground operation, the third of its kind in the Gaza Strip since the start of the war. What’s new?

It is the third ground operation. It differs from the first and second operations by the intensity of the aerial bombardment, the coincidence with a naval operation on the coast of the Gaza Strip and the interruption of the Internet and communications, as well as a complete and complete global blackout.

The fact that Israel carried out three limited ground operations in a short period indicates the following:

Time plays against Israel, which was forced to cease fire several times under American pressure, the most notable of which was the October 1973 war.

Israel is literally doing what America asked of it: advancing, destroying and assassinating some Hamas leaders, the latest of whom is the commander in charge of the air system, Issam Abu Rukba.

A limited multi-pronged attack could mean that Israeli forces want to deceive Hamas about the location and time of the main attack (there may be no main attack).

Through attacks on several axes, Israel seeks to stabilize and disperse Hamas forces across a broad front.

Most of the attacks occurred at night. Which gives an advantage to Israeli forces, as they are equipped for night fighting.

The limited Israeli incursion aims to take a pulse, gather intelligence on Hamas’ preparedness and also test this willingness to fix the target bank. In the event of a ground advance, Israeli forces could remain inside the Gaza Strip and resume the attack on the weakest axis of Hamas forces.

Therefore, the Israeli forces do not give Hamas the shape and characteristics of the war that Hamas prepared in advance in the streets, buildings and alleys of the Strip, which is urban warfare.

Last but not least, Israeli attacks are concentrated around Gaza City. This indicates that the center of gravity of the Hamas movement is in the city, or in the tunnels under the city. Otherwise, what would be the point of Israel targeting Al-Shifa hospital and demanding its evacuation, since Hamas leaders wage war from tunnels beneath this hospital?