When the history of Israel’s policy toward Hamas is investigated, one question comes to the fore: How was Hamas able to grow alongside Israel?
There are similarities between Hamas’s rise to power and Netanyahu’s political career. Hamas came to power in Gaza in June 2007, and Netanyahu emerged as prime minister in the February 2009 elections.
During the 2009 elections, Netanyahu criticized Tzipi Livni, the leader of the rival Kadima party, which was in power at the time, for failing to oust Hamas.
He visited the southern city of Ashkelon following the rocket attack from Gaza on February 3.
In his statement there, Netanyahu spoke about destroying Hamas for the first time.
“We are at the entrance to Ashkelon.” A Grad rocket fell here this morning. This explains everything. Netanyahu said: “Fortunately, a miracle happened and the children who showed me the shrapnel were not harmed,” and he continued his words as follows:
But we cannot rely on miracles. We need to take action to eliminate the threat. The only measure that will achieve this is the overthrow of the Hamas regime in Gaza.
Neutralizing Hamas was not a difficult proposition in 2009. Because the group’s power was weaker then than it is today.
However, after coming to power, Netanyahu made no attempt to oust Hamas.
On December 12, 2019, when a reporter asked if it was a mistake to refrain from overthrowing Hamas, Netanyahu responded;
“When you become a commander, you must decide how the war will be conducted. “I will not take any action for a minute, not even a second, until the conditions are perfect.”
For fourteen years, Netanyahu did not clarify what “conditions” were never met.
It is clear that he promised to overthrow Hamas when it seemed to be in his electoral favor, but after winning the elections, he reneged on this promise because it seemed risky on the political level.
In other words, his belief in waiting for “optimal conditions” before taking action became an excuse for inaction.
The Israeli press described this policy as “Netanyahu’s strategic gamble in Gaza.”
In 2018, the Israeli-based newspaper Ynet said in its analysis of Netanyahu’s policy: “If Netanyahu’s experiment fails, Israelis living near the Gaza border will pay the heaviest price.”
After 5 years, it became clear that the Israeli newspaper was not wrong in its warning. Now the Israeli public is searching for a culprit.
But Netanyahu prefers to mask criticism by saying at every opportunity that a comprehensive investigation will be conducted after the war.
(Tags for translation) Netanyahu