Witnessing the human tragedy in Gaza turns a healthy person’s emotional world upside down. When dealing with events at the political level, it is necessary to understand the way of thinking and political goals of the actor concerned with the event in a calm and emotionless manner. In this regard, retired Brigadier General Yossi Kuperwasser, who heads the research and analysis department at the Israeli military intelligence agency Aman, spoke about the role of Israeli military intelligence in the policy-making process, how Israeli intelligence views Netanyahu, the failure of Israeli intelligence in the Yom Kippur War and the October 7 attacks, and Netanyahu we spoke to. On Hamas policy.
What is the main function of Israeli military intelligence in policy-making processes? What are the differences between Mossad and Shin Bet?
There are three main intelligence agencies in Israel. There are other smaller intelligence organizations, but the largest are Mossad, Shin Bet (Shin Bet), and Military Intelligence (Aman). Mossad is responsible for information gathering activities and operations outside Israel. The Shin Bet is responsible for counter-terrorism and counter-espionage inside Israel, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. AMAN is responsible for all matters related to Israel’s security. It provides tactical, strategic and operational intelligence to the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff. Aman is by far Israel’s largest intelligence agency. In addition to human intelligence, it combines intelligence with all technical means, including visual intelligence, electronic intelligence, and signals. Compared to military intelligence in many countries, AMAN’s mandate is much broader. While in many countries strategic intelligence is carried out by foreign intelligence services, in Israel this work is carried out by AMAN. This is the way the process has been going since the founding of Israel. Because military threats are our priority, AMAN carries out this mission.
What kind of agent is Netanyahu to the Israeli intelligence community? Is he an educated agent, or is he making policy more consistent with his ideological agenda?
Netanyahu has been prime minister for a long time and is a politician who knows how to manage intelligence. In this regard, providing intelligence to Netanyahu is not an easy task. Because Netanyahu’s personal memory is older than that of many in the country, he is a person familiar with Israel’s problems, and he served as prime minister for many years. As you know, decision makers do not only receive information from intelligence agencies. There are other specialized information resources and channels. In addition, decision makers tend to read political issues from their own political perspective. This is normal and always happens this way. Looking at the decision makers I work with, I can say that they always have an opinion about solutions to problems, but they are also open to listening to information. There was tension not only between Netanyahu, but also between many Israeli decision-makers and intelligence agencies. This tension arises from the gap between the facts told by intelligence agencies and the information that decision-makers want to hear. In this regard, there must be a more efficient language between intelligence agencies and decision makers in defining and understanding problems.
What is your explanation for the intelligence failure in the Yom Kippur War?
The main reason for the intelligence failure in the Yom Kippur War was that military intelligence analysts believed that Egypt under Sadat could not start a war unless it had a long-range surface-to-surface missile. This was an understanding stemming from previous military experiences. All alternative information and analyzes that contradict this perspective were ignored. On October 24, 1972, Anwar Sadat changed all his plans, and we did not see that he decided to start the war with the means available to him, without long-range missiles. Instead of the strategy of penetrating deep into the Sinai Peninsula, he decided to start the war by reaching the plains located a short distance from Sinai. We failed to realize that this military move was to change the political status quo, i.e. to reclaim Sinai from Israel. Many Egyptian generals who did not like Anwar Sadat’s new plan were fired. Israeli intelligence did not realize or did not believe that Sadat’s plan had changed. Although there was much information that the Egyptian army was preparing for an attack, the understanding that Egypt would not start a war without possessing long-range missiles persisted. The most important problem in intelligence is the inability to correctly read the enemy’s intentions. In addition, if you come to an understanding or judgment about the enemy and stick to that understanding, it is possible to interpret any information received in a way that confirms that judgment. You will continue to believe that your judgment and understanding are correct until the surprise attack occurs. Nasser’s son-in-law, Ashraf Marwan, is our source on the Yom Kippur War. In that war we had resources at all levels and we had a lot of information. But as I said, Anwar Sadat was committed to the idea that he would not start a war without possessing long-range missiles, so all information that did not support this opinion was ignored.
How did the intelligence failure appear in the October 7 attacks launched by Hamas?
I can say that we do not have enough information to judge this issue and it is too early to say anything. But I can say that intelligence reached a wrong understanding and judgment in the October 7 attacks, similar to what happened in the Yom Kippur War. He concluded that we had repulsed Hamas with Operation Wall Keeper in May 2021. He was thought to be concerned about the humanitarian conditions in Gaza and focused on improving that situation. What intelligence failed to realize was that Hamas was increasingly intent on carrying out a major attack rather than focusing on improving conditions in Gaza. Given the October 7 attack, this appears to have been the product of at least a year of preparation. The most important mistake here is the inability to determine what Hamas’ plan and intentions are. Until the October 7 attack, Hamas’ offensive tactics consisted of using tunnels and launching rockets. We closed the tunnels and blocked the missiles with the Iron Dome system. We found different solutions to the torpedoes and drones they used in the attack. In this regard, the intelligence believed that we could deter Hamas and prevent such attacks from it. It was also believed that they would not be able to overcome the Israeli security wall, neither underground nor above ground. The main problem is that we do not have the resources necessary to inform us of Hamas’ plans and intentions. Thousands of Hamas members participated in the attacks and we had no resources among them. This is amazing. Journalists and others write something, but it is a small part of the picture, and there is not enough information to understand the whole picture. As a result of the investigation, this incident will be revealed.
How do you explain Netanyahu’s policy towards Hamas?
Netanyahu’s policy aimed to keep Hamas under control. Hamas is too weak to act, Islamic Jihad, ISIS, etc. They wanted such organizations to be strong enough so that they could not come to power in Gaza. If I were to explain it with an analogy, routine threats are like mowing the lawn. You cut the grass and it grows again. You can eliminate the threats it creates, but since it is a routine threat, it always has the potential to cause damage. When Hamas attacked, there was a policy of striking it. Netanyahu’s government has long viewed Hamas as a routine threat. This was a mistake because it ignored that Hamas poses a strategic threat. I have said many times that Netanyahu’s policy is wrong. Netanyahu had a policy of belittling Hamas, and it was seen as a chronic threat. However, Hamas was not considered a strategic problem, and could become an existential threat if neglected. This wrong policy made us look weak, and it was Hamas that carried out this attack. The fact that our relations with America were bad for various reasons was also a factor. All our steps towards normalization with Saudi Arabia and improving relations with Turkey were disrupted due to this attack. Believing that we are working to deter Hamas is the most serious political mistake.
Ehud Olmert accused Netanyahu of financing Hamas. What is your comment on that?
This is a policy that began during the era of Ehud Olmert and continues under Netanyahu. I don’t understand why Olmert blames Netanyahu. The truth of the matter is this: We send the taxes we collect from the ports, workers working in Israel, and goods destined for Gaza to Mahmoud Abbas. He had to share with us some of the money we gave Abu Mazen to pay the salaries of government employees in Gaza. Abu Mazen did not want to send this money because of the tension between him and Hamas. Therefore, Hamas said that it would attack Israel if Abu Mazen did not send the money. For these reasons, Hamas increased tension. After this dispute, Qatar offered a solution to reduce tensions and ensure calm, and said that it could pay this money to Hamas. Qatar paid Hamas about $30 million a month. We knew that most of this money was used for Hamas’ military activities. We have been having problems with this issue for years. We let this money go, knowing that it went to Hamas and was used for these activities.
When these events calm down, will Netanyahu emerge from this process stronger or will he be eliminated? What is your assessment?
I am no prophet, but an investigative committee will certainly arise, and many people who hated Netanyahu before the war started believe that the Hamas attacks on October 7 were a golden opportunity to get rid of Netanyahu. But what will happen politically in Israel is beyond my limits. This is not my area of expertise.